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POINTS OF APPEAL
1.

Whereas appellant is guaranteed effective counsel by the

Constitution of the United States, Amendment VI (rights of the
accused) and The Constitution of Utah, Article I section 12 (rights
of

accused

persons),

and

Whereas,

by

statute

and

judicial

interpretation that said counsel must be effective in that "proper
functioning of the adversarial process" must take place to produce
a just result." (Strickland v. Washington, 466 US at 689)

2.

l

Constitutions require "that no accused can be convicted and

imprisoned, unless he has been accorded the right to assistance of
counsel."

3.

(US v. Tolliver, 937 F.2d 1183 7th Cir. 1991)2

Defense

attorney

acted

below

an

objective

standard

of

reasonableness creating the probability that but for counsel's
unprofessional errors the results of the proceedings would have
been substantially different. Counsel's conduct so undermined the
proper functioning of the adversarial process that the proceedings
in this case, cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.

i
1

Stickland v. Washington, The benchmark then for judging
any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether the counsel's conduct
so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial system that
the trial cannot be relied on as having just result.
US v. Tolliver, Constitution requires that no accused can
be convicted or imprisoned unless he has been accorded the right to
the assistance of counsel.
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

Jurisdiction is conferred on this court by the Utah Code Ann.,
Section 78-2A-3 (2)(f), (Court of appeal has jurisdiction over
"Appeals from district

court in criminal

cases, except those

involving a conviction of a first degree or capital felony").
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES

A.

Was counsel's performance below an objective standard of
reasonableness ?

B.

Does the reasonable probability exist that but for counsel's
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceedings would
have been different ?

C.

Did Counsel's conduct so undermine the proper function of the
adversarial process that the proceedings, in this case, cannot
be relied on as having produced just results ?

D.

Did counsel's ineffectiveness prejudice appellant's defense
resulting in loss of constitutional rights?

STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
.1.

Constitution of the United States, Amendment VI (Rights of the
Accused)

2.

Constitution of the State of Utah,

Article I, Section 12

(Rights of Accused Persons )
3.

Utah State Code Ann. sec 78-2A-3(2)(f) (Jurisdiction)

STATEMENT OF CASE

Appellant was charged with a second degree felony of Criminal
(Automobile) Homicide in that it was alleged he, as the actor,
operated a motor vehicle while having a blood alcohol content of
.08% or greater
and caused the death of another.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Following arraignment

and preliminary hearing, appellant,

through defense counsel James Watts, negotiated with prosecution,
a plea agreement with the following stipulation:
For the appellant / defendant:
1- dismissal of pending criminal charge.
2- agreement of all parties to induce the Court to
sentence appellant / defendant on the next lower degree
of offense ( third degree felony ).
For the prosecution:
1- A plea of guilty to a second degree felony, to wit:
Criminal (Automobile) Homicide.
Said plea agreement was conceived from the notion of the
shadow of criminal intent brought to bear from a promised affidavit
from expert witness, Dr. David Boorman. At sentencing, before the
Honorable Judge David
announced,

first

to

S. Young, defense counsel
the

appellant/defendant,

James Watts,

the

incredibly

impacting and subsequently hope shattering information that the key
affidavit from Dr. Boorman would NOT be forthcoming. ,Counsel Watts
then

announced

the

same

incredible

news

to

the

Court

and

prosecution.
Appellant

argues

that

the

incredibly

inane,

blatantly

ineffective and obvious unprofessional errors in not procuring the
affidavit nor continuing further court action, until either the
document or expert witness could be produced, fell far below an
objective standard of reasonableness and was so prejudicial, that
but for the unprofessional errors, the results of the proceedings
would have been different, resulting in loss of appellant's rights.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

This case was not tried, therefore there is no evidence to
cite

in support in a statement of facts, Information in this case

is as follows:

Appellant was charged

with Utah Code ann.

76-5-207

Criminal (Automobile) Homicide, being in the second degree
punishable by 1 to 15 years in the State Penitentiary

Appellant pled guilty to said charge on 18 August 1989
before the Honorable David S. Young Judge Third Judicial
District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah.

Appellant was sentenced on 28 September, 1989. by the
Honorable Judge Young to confinement in the Utah State Prison
to not less than one nor more than fifteen years and other
appurtenances.

Appellant is currently incarcerated in the Utah State
Prison.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Appellant argues:
That the Constitution of the United States, 6th Amendment and
the Constitution of Utah article I section 12 guarantees the right
of effective assistance of counsel in criminal prosecution.
That defendant was entitled to more than just a warm body
standing next to him during the criminal procedure.
That no denial

of

effective assistance

of counsel

when

attorney's representation is reasonable.
That the purpose of the effective assistance guarantee of the
6th Amendment is to ensure that criminal defendants receive a fair
trial.
That judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether the
counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the
adversarial process that the proceedings cannot be relied on as
having produced a just result.
That appellant's counsel, James Watts, presented himself as
professional, reasonable, and effective in pursuit of appellant's
defense and indeed was paid a retainer.
That discussions were held and conclusions were reached whereby counsel arranged with prosecution the terms of a plea agreement,
wherein appellant would plead guilty to the charge in trade for the
dismissal of a pending charge and agreement of all parties to
induce the court to sentence the defendant under the next lesser
degree. (3rd degree)
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Argument
Appellant argues he is guaranteed the right of effective
assistance of counsel by and through the Constitution of the United
States Amendment

VI.

Further, Appellant argues he is guaranteed

the right of effective counsel by and through the Constitution of
Utah Article I section 12.^
Further, United States Supreme Court, in interpreting the
rights of criminal defendants, stated the purpose of the effective
assistance guarantee of the VI amendment is to "... ensure that
criminal

defendants

receive

a

fair

trial".

Strickland

v.

Washington, 466 US 668 (1984)5; McMann v. Richardson, 397 US 759,
771, n.14 (1970)6; Cuvler v. Sullivan, 446 US 335,344-45 (1980)7
Moreover, Appellant's entitlement extends beyond having just
a warm body standing next to him during the criminal proceedings
and reaches to effective assistance of counsel when attorney's
representation is reasonable and applies to both retained and

6

Constitution of the United States Amendment VI - "In all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to ...
have the assistance of counsel for his defense."
*
Constitution of Utah, Article I section 12 - "In criminal
prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and defend
in person and by counsel."
5

Strickland at 689. - " the purpose of the effective
assistance guarantee of the 6th amendment is not to improve the
quality of legal representation, although that is a goal of
considerable importance to the legal system. The purpose is simply
to ensure that criminal defendants receive a fair trial."
5

McMann v. Richardson - "Sixth amendment right to counsel
is right to effective assistance of counsel."
7

Cuyler v. Sullivan, "ineffective assistance may not be
claimed for counsel's actions where no sixth amendment right to
counsel exists."
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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appointed counsel.
Appellant's professional

relationship with counsel, James

Watts, predated the instant case and counsel's conduct seemed
satisfactory to the Appellant taking into account the variety of
circumstances faced by counsel and seemingly legitimate decisions
regarding how best to represent criminal defendants.
Seeking to ensure Appellant's right to a fair trial through
proper functioning of the adversarial process to produce a just
result, Appellant retained services of counsel seeking reasonable
representation.
Counsel, on its own, conceived and initiated a course of
action presented

to Appellant

in several

brief meetings; the

reasonableness of the proposal and the tactical decisions were
accepted as a tolerable compromise.
Presented was a proposal wherein Appellant would plead guilty
to 2nd degree Criminal Homicide in exchange for Prosecution's
support of Appellant's being sentenced to the next lower severity
of crime (3rd degree felony) and prosecution's motion for dismissal
of pending criminal action. As an inducement counsel, in colloquy
with prosecution, represented the acquisition and presentation of
a certain affidavit from one Dr. David Boorman. Defense counsel, in
furtherance of his methodology, purported this expert witness'
affidavit would indicate a significant lessening of Appellant's
culpability due to an adverse and debilitating drug interaction
resulting

from

said doctor's

prescribed use

in concert

with

doctor's assurance to Appellant that no adverse effect would result
in mixing prescribed medication and moderate alcohol intake.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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In its

landmark

decision Strickland

v. Washington**, the

benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness of counsel "must
be whether the counsel's conduct so undermined the adversarial
process, that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a
just result"; and further "no particular set of detailed rules for
counsel's conduct can satisfactorily take account of the variety of
circumstances faced by defense counsel of the range of legitimate
decisions regarding how best to represent the criminal defendant."
In Bertolotti v. Dugger9, 838 F.2d 1503, 1510 (11th Cir.
1989). The court stated "review of assistance should not grade
counsels

performance,

but

focus

on

fundamental

fairness

of

challenged proceedings." These and many other cases led to the
Strickland

Court

ineffectiveness]

assertion
is

a

"a

reasonable

probability

probability

sufficient

to

[of

undermine

confidence in the outcome.".

Georgetown Law Journal concludes (Vol 79 #4 p 969 Ineffective
Assistance of Counsel) "The 6th Amendment guarantees the right to
effective assistance of counsel

in criminal

prosecutions. In

Strickland v. Washington the Supreme Court established

a two

pronged standard to govern ineffective assistance claims. The
defendant must prove (1) That counsel's performance fell below an

5

see footnote 1, at 688-689

9

Bertolotti v. Dugger, "Federal Court of appeal's role in
collaterally reviewing state judicial proceeding on ineffective
assistance claim is not to point out counselor's error, but only
to determine whether counselor's performance in given proceedings
was so beneath providing professional norms that attorney was not
performing Digitized
as "counsel'
guaranteed
by Clark
Sixth
Amendment."
by the Howard W. Hunter
Law Library, J. Reuben
Law School,
BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

objective standard of reasonableness and (2) That there is a
reasonable

probability

that

but

for

counsel's

unprofessional

errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different."
Appellant concurs and so argues.

Counsel

proposed

said

agreed; Appellant, reassured
agreed;

The

"Deal

was

agreement;
by

Struck",

Prosecution

defense
and

the

reticently

counsel, reluctantly
case

proceeded

to

sentencing.
Reciproque to the plea bargain, which was not representative
of the Appellant's view, the sentencing on the next lower severity
of crime gave way to legislated rationale in-that criminal homicide
in the second degree (to which the appellant plead guilty) requires
"willful, knowing, and reckless gross deviation from the standard
of care that a normal person would exercise", where-as lacking
absolute culpability (as appellant asserts) is criminal homicide in
the third degree

(to which the appellant would be sentenced)

requires "simple negligence, the failure to exercise that degree of
care which reasonable and prudent persons exercise."
Prosecution's part in the agreed plea bargain was to move for
dismissal of an existing apart change, with which there is no
argument. Secondly, they were to speak with their silence in favor
of the motion by counsel for sentencing under the next lesser
degree of crime.

Although the Appellant's plea of guilty "is not voluntary
simply because it is the product of sentient choice, but is
involuntary if, though it involves al choice, it is the result of
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

duress". Heidman v. US, C.A. 8th 1960 281 F.2d 805.10
"We cannot hold that it is unconstitutional for the state to
extend a benefit to a defendant who in turn extends a substantial
benefit to the state."

Brady v. US, 90 S.Ct.

146311

Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 11(e) allows plea
agreements that require the defendant to plead guilty to the
charged offense, in agreement prosecutor is authorized to (1)
move for dismissal of other charges; (2)i3 Agree not to oppose
defendants request for a particular sentence. (3)1 To agree that
a specific sentence is appropriate for the disposition of the case.

Defense's part in the agreed plea bargain was to, of course, have
appellant plead guilty; however, central to the core of the plea
agreement was the procurement and admission, to the Court, of the
promised affidavit from Dr. Boorman, appellant's post heart-attack
physician.

iU

Heidman v. US, "A plea of guilty is not voluntary simply
because it is a product sentient choice, but is involuntary if
though it involves a choice, it is a result of duress."
11

Brady v. US, "We cannot hold that it is unconstitutional
for the state to extend a benefit to a defendant who in turn
extends a substantial benefit to the state ..."
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 11(e)(1)
Plea agreement procedure in general. The attorney for the
gpvernment and the attorney for the defendant . . . engage in
discussions with the view towards reaching an agreement that, upon
the entering of a plea of guilty ... to a charged offense ... the
attorney for the government will do any of the following:
(A) - Move for dismissal of other charges.
^
Id. (B) - Make recommendations or agree not to oppose the
defendant's request for a particular sentence.
14

Id. (C) - Agree that a specific sentence
appropriateDigitized
deposition
case.
by the Howard W.of
Hunter
Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

is

the

The Court, the Prosecution, and the Appellant, in unison,
anticipated the production and admission of said document and
indeed it was predicate to the plea agreement.
Appellant's decision to participate in the plea agreement, via
his guilty plea, and prosecution's agreement to speak by their
silence in support of reduction of sentencing, was held together by
the very glue of the production of this document. Indeed the very
life blood that gave the agreement viability, was the admission of
this document.
A plea agreement is generally treated as a contract, the
instant case included; Thus it may be breached.

Santobel lo v. New

York, 404 US 257 1971 15; US v. McCarthy, C.A. 1st. 1970,
433 F.2d 59116.
i

On the morning of Sept. 29th, 1989, (42 days after the
appellant plead guilty as his part of the plea agreement)

before

the Honorable David S. Young Judge Third Judicial District in and
for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, came the time fixed for the
sentencing of the appellant. As a matter of course all parties
concerned, the defendant, the prosecution (Mr. Scott Reed), and the
Judge, anticipated and expected the production and admission of Dr.
Boorman's affidavit at the hands of the defense counsel James
Watts.

lw

Santobello v. New York, When a guilty plea rests in any
significant degree on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so
that it can be said to be part of an inducement or consideration,
such promise must be fulfilled.
US v. McCarthy, "Sentence based on guilty plea induced by
reliance onDigitized
unfulfilled
prosecution promise."
by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

The Defense counsel, seconds before announcing same to the Court,
informed the appellant of the unbelievably destructive news that he
had NOT obtained the affidavit from Dr. Boorman. The defendant was
heartstruck and in shock. While the brevity of time spent in
consultation between counsel and appellant does not, without more,
establish ineffectiveness instead is only a factor to be considered
in the totality of the curcumstances .Carbo v. US, CA 5th, 1978, 581
F.2d 91, 92, 93.1]
Through the mind of the appellant passed the realization that
all hopes of any sentencing reduction consideration had been dashed
by defense counsel's ineffectiveness and unprofessionalism in not
obtaining said affidavit. Defense counsel stood and announced to
the court and prosecutor the self-same news of his inability to
produce the document, key to the plea agreement. The prosecutor
rose instantly and enthusiastically said "We're backing out of our
deal." The Honorable David S. Young
forthwith

retorted, "I agree," and

and without further consideration, sentenced Appellant

to the full, undiminished, no longer plea bargained sentence of
1 to 15 years in the Utah State Prison. Appellant was remanded to
the custody of the Salt Lake County Sheriff for transport to the
Utah State Prison, lacking any further action by defense counsel.

11

Carbo v. US, When a guilty plea is entered the only
required duty of counsel in rendering reasonably effective
assistance is to ascertain if the plea is entered voluntarily and
knowingly ... the brevity of time spent in consultation with
counsel does not without more, establish ineffectiveness butinstead
is only a factor to be considered in the totality of the
circumstances.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

CONCLUSION
Appellant

concludes

that

the

wanton

disregard

for

professionalism, the unreasonableness of the last second disclosure
of counsel's inability to procure the doctor's affidavit, the
abject

unfairness

of

non-pursuit

in

seeking

remedy

for

the

inability to procure said affidavit by means of continuance,
subpoena,

renegotiation, and/or

withdrawal

of plea, and

the

objective ineffectiveness of counsel's assistance to appellant, so
undermined the proper functioning of these proceedings that they
"cannot be relied on as having produced a just result"; Indeed, but
for

defense

counsel,

the

counsel's
results

unprofessional
of

the

errors

proceedings

and
would

ineffective
have

been

significantly different;

Therefore, appellant asserts and claims ineffective assistance of
counsel in that his Sixth Amendment rights to effective assistance
of counsel in these criminal proceedings were indeed violated.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 US 687-692 (1984)18
McMann v. Richardson, 397 US 759, 771 n.14 (1970)19
US v. Scott, CA 5th, 625 F.2d 623 (1980)20

see footnote #1 and #5 and other Strickland refs.
McMann v. Richardson, "6th Amendment rights to counsel is
right to effective assistance of counsel."
US v. Scott, "A conviction on a guilty plea that is
entered solely as a result of faulty advice is a miscarriage of
justice."
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Strater v. Garrison, 611 F.2d 61 (CA 4th 1979)21
Osborn v. Shillinger, 861 F.2d 613 (CA 10th 1988)22

And further, prays this Court to remand this case to the
District Court with an order to allow appellant to withdraw His
plea of guilty.

Respectfully Submitted This ^ffiffi day ofc=a^^,-i^u^}^u^\

, 1993

T
Eduarjzfo Garza

2i

Strater v. Garrison,"Judgement of conviction must be
vacated when it appears that a guilty plea would never have been
tendered if defendant had been properly advised."
^
Osborn v. Shillinger, "performance of defense counsel was
not only constitutionally unreasonable and ineffective, but counsel
abandoned required
duty
of Law
loyalty
to Clark
hisLawclient..."
Digitized by the Howard
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